

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-10 NSC-07 NSCE-00 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 PM-03 L-02 SPC-01 SAJ-01 DRC-01

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R 021859Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1512

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 05336

LIMDIS

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

SHAPE FOR INTAF

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, GW, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, LINKAGE AND PHASE II

REDUCTIONS: DEFENSE MINISTRY VIEWS

REF: BONN 2951 AND 2952

BEGIN SUMMARY: ACDA COUNSELOR NEWHOUSE DISCUSSED
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF MBFR LINKAGE ISSUE IN SEPARATE
MEETINGS APRIL 2 WITH SENIOR DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS.
THE GERMANS URGED EARLY ALLIED DISCUSSION OF LINKAGE
QUESTION, FAVORED LIMITED IN TIME GROUND FORCE LIMITA-
TION AGREEMENT AS PART OF MBFR I AND DESCRIBED CURRENT
DEFMIN THINKING ON BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS IN MBFR II.
SEPTEL COVERS DEFMIN VIEWS ON WARNING TIME AND OTHER
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MILITARY ASPECTS OF MBFR. END SUMMARY.

1. ACDA COUNSELOR NEWHOUSE, ACCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF, HAD DISCUSSIONS ON MBFR ISSUES APRIL 2 WITH ADMIRAL STEINHAUS (DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING STAFF) AND GENERAL BRANDT (ACTING DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY POLICY AND PLANS). DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON ISSUE OF LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO MBFR PHASES AND CHARACTER OF BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS IN MBFR II.

2. STEINHAUS BEGAN BY COMMENTING THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA HAD REACHED A STALEMATE AND THAT A CONDITION TO PROGRESS WOULD BE THE FORMULATING OF A MORE CONCRETE LINK BETWEEN THE TWO MBFR PHASES. STEINHAUS, AS WELL AS BRANDT AND DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS, SAID THAT THE COMMON CEILING GOAL IS THE CENTRAL POINT OF THE GERMAN POSITION ON MBFR. IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN MBFR I, STEINHAUS THOUGHT THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO GO BEYOND WHAT THEY HAD SAID SO FAR ON LINKAGE TO THE SOVIETS. HE URGED THAT THE ALLIES USE THE EASTER BREAK TO BEGIN CLEARING UP WHAT IT IS WE WISH TO PRESENT TO THE SOVIETS ON LINKAGE.

3. STEINHAUS SAID THE GERMANS ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TAKING CUTS IN MBFR II. HE SAID MBFR II CUTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FRG OR EVEN TO THE FRG PLUS THE BELGIANS AND DUTCH. HE SPOKE POSITIVELY OF A FORMULATION ALONG THE LINES THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD TAKE PART IN THE MBFR-II NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD START AT A CERTAIN POINT. HE INQUIRED, IN THIS CONNECTION, WHETHER THE NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE MORE AMENABLE TO MBFR II CUTS OF BRITISH FORCES.

4. BESIDES THE ABOVE FORMULATION ON LINKAGE, STEINHAUS SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE SEQUENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCLUSION OF MBFR I NEGOTIATIONS, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MBFR-I AGREEMENT AND

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THE BEGINNING OF MBFR-II NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE THE GERMANS HAVE NO FIXED POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT, STEINHAUS SPOKE FAVORABLY ABOUT THE OLD PLANNING STAFF IDEA OF AN OVERLAP BETWEEN IMPLEMENTATION OF MBFR-I RESULTS AND THE BEGINNING OF MBFR-II NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE POINTS, STEINHAUS ALSO VOICED SUPPORT FOR A LIMITED IN TIME FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT, AS PART OF THE MBFR-I AGREEMENT, AND AS CONSIDERATION FOR A

SOVIET AGREEMENT WITHIN MBFR I TO THE COMMON CEILING
END OBJECTIVE. HE RAISED THE QUESTION, WHICH THE
DEFENSE MINISTRY IS JUST BEGINNING TO EXAMINE, OF HOW
SUCH AN FLA COULD BE VERIFIED.

5. WHILE REITERATING GERMAN OPPOSITION TO SINGLING OUT
OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, STEINHAUS

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LIMDIS

STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THE CONTINUED GERMAN WISH FOR TREAT-
MENT OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN MBFR II. HE VOICED SOME
SUSPICION THAT SOME U.S. OFFICIALS MIGHT NOT WANT AN
MBFR-II NEGOTIATION TO REACH FRUITION, THEREBY RENDERING
MBFR ESSENTIALLY AN EXERCISE IN BURDEN SHARING. STEIN-
HAUS RECALLED THAT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY HAD FAVORED
TREATMENT OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN MBFR LONG BEFORE THE
SOVIETS HAD MADE SUCH DEMANDS IN VIENNA.

6. BOTH WITH STEINHAUS AND BRANDT, NEWHOUSE INQUIRED

CONCERNING DEFMIN POSITIONS ON HOW THE BUNDESWEHR WOULD TAKE ITS CUTS IN MBFR II. THE GERMANS SAID THEY EXPECTED THAT ROUGHLY HALF (25,000) OF THE 49,000 WESTERN MBFR II CUTS SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE BUNDESWEHR. IN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY VIEW, THE EQUIVALENT TO U.S./SOVIET WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE A THINNING OUT RATHER THAN A DISBANDING OF GERMAN UNITS AND A PLACING OF SUCH THINNED OUT GERMAN TROOPS INTO SOME SORT OF RESERVE STATUS. THIS WOULD GIVE BOTH SIDES AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE

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THEIR FORCES SHOULD THE AGREEMENT BE BREACHED. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE GERMANS WISH TO UTILIZE THE 25,000 STANDBY READINESS GROUND FORCES, IN THEIR PROPOSAL FOR RESTRUCTURED BUNDESWEHR, FOR PURPOSES OF MBFR. THE GERMANS CONTEND THAT THESE FORCES ARE REGULAR RATHER THAN RESERVE UNITS OF THE BUNDESWEHR AND THAT THEIR CONVERSION TO FULL RESERVE STATUS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS MBFR-II REDUCTIONS.

7. NEWHOUSE EXPRESSED SOME SKEPTICISM AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS GERMAN APPROACH IN THE MBFR-II NEGOTIATIONS. BRANDT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, IN THE PROPOSED RESTRUCTURING, ONLY 2,000 OF THE 25,000 STANDBY READINESS GROUND FORCES WOULD BE ON ACTIVE DUTY AT ANY TIME; (THESE FORCES WOULD NOT THEN BE IN TRAINING BUT WOULD JOIN THEIR COMPANY OR PLATOON AT LEAST ONCE A YEAR). HOWEVER, STEINHAUS AND BRANDT SAID IT WAS "A VERY ESSENTIAL POINT OF OUR POSITION" THAT REDUCED BUNDESWEHR FORCES NOT BE DISBANDED. RATHER THAN FOCUS ON REDUCED BUNDESWEHR UNITS, THE GERMANS ARGUED THAT THE MAIN POINT WAS REACHING A MAXIMUM OVERALL WESTERN CEILING. IN SHORT, THE FOCUS SHOULD NOT BE ON THE GERMAN TROOPS TO BE REDUCED BUT RATHER ON THE EVENTUAL CEILING. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOLD OUT UNTIL THE FRG IMPLEMENTED ITS FORCE STRUCTURE PROPOSALS, THE GERMANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ELONGATE THE TIMETABLE FOR SUCH IMPLEMENTATION. BRANDT SAID SUCH AN EXTENSION OF THE TIMETABLE FOR FORCE STRUCTURE PROPOSALS ALREADY WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. IN THIS CONNECTION, STEINHAUS SAID HE ANTICIPATED THAT THE MBFR-II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE A LONG ONE--HE SAID HE EXPECTED "IT WOULD TAKE YEARS."

8. COMMENT: AS WE HAVE REPORTED (REFTELS), THE FONOFF SHARES OURSKEPTICISM OVER THE NEGOTIABILITY OF THE ABOVE DEFMIN POSITION ON THE CHARACTER OF BUNDESWEHR CUTS IN MBFR II. BOTH BRANDT AND STEINHAUS

APPEARED RATHER DEFENSIVE IN SEEKING TO ASSUAGE THE
SKEPTICISM VOICED BY U.S. REPS.

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9. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH US, FONOFF MBFR DEPT
CHIEF RUTH ADOPTED A SOMEWHAT MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO
THE LINKAGE QUESTION. FONOFF REPS PREVIOUSLY HAD
SPOKEN FAVORABLY OF A LINKAGE FORMULATION TO THE EFFECT
THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE FORCES IN
MBFR II. RUTH NOW OFFERED FORMULATION THAT "ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS COULD CONSIDER THE REDUCTION OF FORCE" IN
MBFR II. WHILE NOTING OBJECTIONS TO FLA IDEA IN APRIL
30, 1973 U.S. PAPER, RUTH VOICED SUPPORT FOR CONCEPT OF
NO INCREASE OF GROUND FORCES DURING LIMITED PERIOD INTO
MBFR II NEGOTIATIONS.
HILLENBRAND

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